



Climate Change and 





Author post-print (accepted) deposited by Coventry University’s Repository 
 
Original citation & hyperlink:  
Maughan, C 2019, 'Collective Unconsciousness: Climate Change and Responsibility in Ian 








Publisher: Taylor and Francis 
 
This is an Accepted Manuscript of an article published by Taylor & Francis in 
GeoHumanities on 18/01/2019, available 
online: http://www.tandfonline.com/10.1080/2373566X.2018.1548907 
 
Copyright © and Moral Rights are retained by the author(s) and/ or other copyright owners. A 
copy can be downloaded for personal non-commercial research or study, without prior permission 
or charge. This item cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining 
permission in writing from the copyright holder(s). The content must not be changed in any way or 
sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the copyright 
holders.  
 
This document is the author’s post-print version, incorporating any revisions agreed during the 
peer-review process. Some differences between the published version and this version may 




“Collective Unconsciousness: Climate Change and Responsibility in Ian 1 
McEwan’s Solar” 2 
Author: Dr C J Maughan, Research Fellow, Centre for Agroecology Water and 3 
Resilience, Coventry University, Priory Street, Coventry, CV1 5FB. 4 
chris.maughan@coventry.ac.uk 5 
Abstract 6 
This paper makes links between issues of responsibility, climate change and 7 
contemporary literature, using Ian McEwan’s Solar as a case study. The paper 8 
addresses not only oversights in the existing critical responses to the novel, but 9 
identifies important insights that the novel can offer into a frontier of the politics of 10 
climate change: collective responsibility. Using and adapting Fredric Jameson’s 11 
theory of the ‘Political Unconscious’, the paper argues that many dominant 12 
conceptions about how to act on climate change (and other environmental problems) 13 
are based on patently outdated modes of political thought, especially those oriented 14 
around conceptions of individual responsibility. Using Jameson’s framework, this 15 
paper offers a way of reading beyond the failings of dominant modes of thinking to 16 
the anticipations of collective responsibility and action which exist in the margins of 17 
literary texts. By way of conclusion the paper offers some reflections on how an 18 
ecocriticism guided by such a reading strategy can inform the work of an 19 
experimental environmental activism.   20 
 21 





1. Introduction 25 
Who do we blame for climate change? And whose responsibility is it to fix it?  26 
 27 
In certain respects, considerations of blame and responsibility might seem natural in 28 
discussions about climate change. After all, climate change is certainly among the 29 
most pressing challenges we face as a species: it is already thought to cause around 30 
400,000 human deaths a year (DARA and Climate Vulnerable Forum 2012, 17), to 31 
be doing irreversible damage to vital ecosystems, such as coral reefs (Speers et al. 32 
2016), and may, of course, lead to the extinction of the human race (Morgan 2009) 33 
(as well as countless other non-human species (IPPC 2015, 13)). In certain other 34 
respects, however, considerations of responsibility are fiendishly difficult to reconcile 35 
with the sheer scale of climate change. Climate change is not an event which can be 36 
easily mapped in time or space, its effects are numerous and (still) poorly 37 
understood, and take a long and (often) indeterminate amount of time to register 38 
themselves. For example, how do we attribute responsibility for emissions accrued 39 
over a 250 year period (IPPC 2015, 4), especially when many of those involved will 40 
soon be (or are already) dead? Climate change is also much more than simply a 41 
material phenomenon, it is messily entangled with the ideas, cultures, and manifold 42 
irrationalities which make up our human and non-human worlds. Far from being a 43 
graspable and containable problem, it is no less than the material and social 44 
condition of the entire world, the culmination of millennia of human (and non-human) 45 
activity.  46 
 47 
In an attempt to address this apparent impasse, this paper makes links between 48 
issues of responsibility, climate change and contemporary literature, using Ian 49 
McEwan’s novel, Solar (2010) as a case study. The paper addresses not only 50 
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oversights in the existing critical responses to the novel, but identifies important 51 
insights that the novel can offer into a frontier of the politics of climate change: 52 
collective responsibility. Using and adapting Fredric Jameson’s (1989) theory of the 53 
‘Political Unconscious’, the paper argues that many dominant conceptions about how 54 
to act on climate change (and other environmental problems) are based on patently 55 
outdated modes of political thought, especially those oriented around conceptions of 56 
individual responsibility. Using Jameson’s framework, this paper offers a way of 57 
reading beyond the failings of dominant modes of thinking to the anticipations of 58 
collective responsibility and action which exist in the margins of literary texts.  59 
 60 
Literary theorists have repeatedly noted the challenges presented by climate 61 
change’s unprecedented spatio-temporal scales. Timothy Morton’s (Morton 2010) 62 
concept of the ‘hyperobject’, for example, frames climate change as something we 63 
are always ‘inside’, and which we therefore struggle to engage with. Similarly, Rob 64 
Nixon (Nixon 2011, 2) argues that it is precisely climate change’s creeping invisibility 65 
– its ‘slow violence’ – which ‘hinder[s] our efforts to mobilize and act decisively’ 66 
against it. Despite this, strategies focused on the attribution of personal responsibility 67 
still play a major role in conversation about climate change, from ‘grassroots’ 68 
campaigns to more ‘top-down’ initiatives. Invoking Judith Butler’s idea of 69 
‘responsibilitization’, Mark Fisher (Fisher 2009, 70) notes the problem of 70 
emphasising individual responsibility within climate change’s systemic vastness: 71 
‘Instead of saying that everyone – i.e. every one – is responsible for climate change, 72 
we all have to do our bit, it would be better to say that no-one is, and that’s the very 73 
problem’. The challenge, as Butler (Butler 2009, 13) herself refers to it, is ‘to rethink 74 
and reformulate a conception of global responsibility’ in order to create conditions for 75 




In this article, I look at Solar as an exemplum of the tensions which abound in 78 
thinking about climate change and responsibility. Unlike almost all of the novel’s 79 
critics, however, I draw a number of valuable lessons from the novel. Indeed, not 80 
only does the plot of Solar play out key dynamics in thinking about how blame is 81 
routinely apportioned in climate change discourse, but, interestingly, these same 82 
dynamics have also played out in the novel’s critical reception. Typically, critics of 83 
the novel have called McEwan to task for, as Richard Kerridge (2010, 160) puts it, 84 
failing to ‘imagin[e] for us […] in artistic form, the feelings we do not yet dare to 85 
have’. Using and adapting Jameson’s ‘political unconscious’, I contend that such 86 
expectations are unrealistic; rarely has literature been able to offer, what Thoerdor 87 
Adorno (qtd. in Jameson, 2004: 51), calls, a ‘positive representation of an 88 
emancipated society’, without, as McEwan himself puts it, ‘falling flat with moral 89 
intent’ (qtd. in (RealClimate and Network 2010)). Solar, like climate change, cannot 90 
be understood in straightforwardly didactic terms. That said, if read using Jameson’s 91 
theory of the political unconscious, one can begin to approach what cannot be 92 
grasped directly; that is, the fatal flaws of our current thinking and glimpses of what 93 




2. Jameson and ‘the political unconscious’ 98 
 99 
In The Political Unconscious, Jameson (1989, 17)  argues for ‘the priority of the 100 
political interpretation of literary texts […] not as an optional auxiliary to other 101 
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interpretative methods […] but rather as the absolute horizon of all reading and of all 102 
interpretation’. Jameson’s interest in this regard is not merely the overt ways in which 103 
literary material sometimes addresses political issues, but instead its indirect or 104 
‘unconscious’ registration of political dynamics. Jameson’s work allows us to move 105 
away from worrying about what McEwan (or indeed any other author) allegedly 106 
intended, to emphasising the importance of the act of reading in uncovering the vast 107 
unconscious which the literary structure makes accessible to us. ‘The literary 108 
structure’, he tells us,  109 
 110 
far from being completely realized on any one of its levels tilts powerfully into 111 
the underside or impense or non-dit, in short, into the very political 112 
unconscious, of the text, such that the latter's dispersed semes […] 113 
themselves then insistently direct us to the informing power of forces or 114 
contradictions which the text seeks in vain wholly to control or master. 115 
(Jameson 1989, 49) 116 
 117 
While, as Jameson suggests, texts will always struggle ‘in vain’ to contain their 118 
contradictions, the actual process of uncovering them is far from straightforward, 119 
particularly given the strength of the forces complicit in their concealment. As 120 
Jameson sees it, our social and political worlds form a complex web, ‘crisscrossed 121 
and intersected by a variety of impulses from contradictory modes of cultural 122 
production all at once’ (Jameson 1989, 95). While this complexity is important to 123 
acknowledge for political reasons, this also clearly presents problems to anyone 124 
attempting to understand the world, especially, as we have seen, with something as 125 
multi-scalar and multi-temporal as climate change. Jameson’s method for navigating 126 
such a complex landscape is to outline what he calls ‘a series of enlarging theoretical 127 
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horizons’ that, in three stages, guide the analysis ‘toward one particular order of 128 
textual phenomena’ (Jameson 1989, 91, 71). Such an approach achieves the ideal 129 
situation, as Jameson (1989, 45) puts it, of helping us to ‘break the reifying habit of 130 
thinking of a given narrative as an object, or as a unified whole, or as a static 131 
structure’. 132 
The analysis that follows reproduces Jameson’s (1989, 102) approach by 133 
rehearsing a general movement of these analytical horizons, from individual text as a 134 
‘series of events in time’ to the ‘untranscendable horizon’ of the text’s historical 135 
production. A fuller description of these horizons and how they intersect is given as 136 
part of the readings themselves; however, by way of a basic overview they can be 137 
understood to focalise interactions at the level of i) the individual, ii) social relations, 138 
and finally iii) historical production. Such a framework, I argue, is essential for 139 
guiding readers through the complexity of our world, and, moreover, in constructing 140 
an apprehension of climate change not ‘as an object’ or as a ‘static structure’, but as 141 
a complex process apprehendable only at all three of these ‘horizons’.  142 
Jameson’s political unconscious invites us, therefore, to challenge the habits 143 
of cognition that result in simplistic understandings of climate change, ones which 144 
end up misattributing ‘blame’ at the individual level or even denying its existence 145 
altogether. Jameson’s approach does this, not by showcasing particular texts as 146 
exemplars of an ideal vision of the world, but by reading beyond their surfaces, to 147 
their silences and contradictions (as well as their utopian implications). 148 
Contemporary narratives of all kinds (not just those explicitly about climate change) 149 
can similarly be read as, in Jameson’s words, ‘mythic resolutions of issues’ – like 150 
climate change – ‘that [we] are unable to articulate conceptually’ (Jameson 1989, 151 
79).  152 
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In sum, a thoroughgoing, multi-levelled analysis such as the one outlined by 153 
Jameson is utterly essential in an understanding a problem like climate change, 154 
especially if such a project is to be brought into the realm of representational and 155 
cultural theory. If climate change, as a phenomenon occurring within history and 156 
bound up with social and economic relations, currently evades representation in the 157 
ways Morton and Nixon have suggested, one option is to look at how it is already 158 
mis-represented ‘in textual form’; that is, how the text conceals the ‘informing power 159 
of forces or contradictions’ which underlie climate change. The end result will offer 160 
readings finally commensurate with climate change itself, which through its sheer 161 
existence demands a change in how we look at the world. 162 
Before I move on to put this approach into action, I turn first to note the way in 163 
which Solar’s critical reception has appeared to reproduce a politics of climate 164 
change definitively counter to this view; that is, one focused on the directly symbolic 165 
implications of the central character’s ‘personal responsibility’.  166 
 167 
3. Ian McEwan - Solar (2010) 168 
Ian McEwan’s Solar tells the story of Michael Beard, a recipient of the Nobel Prize 169 
for physics who finds himself at the forefront of the British attempt to identify 170 
technological solutions to the intertwined crises of energy and the environment. 171 
Despite his first-class education and prestigious profile, Beard’s inner world is one of 172 
emotional turmoil and moral disarray. The story begins with Beard distracted from his 173 
duties as head of the ‘National Centre for Renewable Energy’ amidst the breakdown 174 
of his fifth marriage. As Beard is drawn into a vortex of jealousy, petty revenge, lust 175 
and self-loathing generated by this situation, he is shocked to discover that his wife, 176 
Patrice, is having an affair with one of his research assistants, Tom Aldous. Following 177 
8 
 
a brief but non-violent confrontation, during which Aldous attempts to confide in 178 
Beard that he is on the verge of a solar energy breakthrough, Aldous accidentally 179 
slips and falls, hitting his head on a coffee table. He is killed instantly. Realising he 180 
will almost certainly be accused of Aldous’ murder, Beard decides to flee the scene, 181 
though not before planting evidence which would incriminate another of his wife’s 182 
lovers, Rodney Tarpin. With a sound alibi of his own, Beard is never a serious 183 
suspect, and Tarpin goes down for the murder having already aroused police 184 
suspicion through previous violent conduct. Shortly after the episode, Beard 185 
discovers papers addressed to him from Aldous detailing the plans for a new type of 186 
solar panel. The rest of the novel is split into two time periods (2005 and 2009) 187 
during which we learn that Beard has set up a business, with the intent to develop 188 
the Aldous’ plans, pass them off as his own, and exploit them on the international 189 
market. 190 
 191 
4. Solar’s critical reception 192 
Literary-critical responses to Solar have been slow to emerge. In their 2011 review of 193 
‘literature and climate change’, Adam Trexler and Adeline Johns-Putra (2011, 192) 194 
noted a lack of scholarship on the novel, though suggested that Solar ‘will almost 195 
certainly be the focus of much research’ over the coming years. At the time of 196 
writing, however, there remain only a handful of serious critical engagements with 197 
the novel, almost all of which have attempted to draw-out straightforward allegorical 198 
readings relating to the behaviour of the central character, Michael Beard. Ilany 199 
Kogan (2012, 1311), for example, suggests the novel gives us ‘the opportunity to be 200 
in touch with human frailties, which, alas, reside in us all’; similarly, Patrick Murphy 201 
(2014, 150), notes the novel’s ‘pessimistic attitude about human behavior’; and Eva 202 
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Zemanek (2012, 52), who recommends Solar’s usefulness in thinking about ‘risk’, a 203 
point she demonstrates by drawing parallels between ‘the risks [Beard] is taking in 204 
his private life’ and the risks we are taking collectively with climate change. 205 
Overwhelmingly critics have also rejected the novel on this basis. As Graham 206 
Huggan (2015, 87) suggests, Solar has been ‘picked on, with some justification, as a 207 
misfiring satirical take on the bad ‘‘issues novel’’’ [emphasis added]. These readings, 208 
I argue, depend upon a particularly limited vision of what allegory is or could do, and 209 
certainly preclude the possibility of readings that go beyond the simple parameters 210 
set up by the allegory. I return to this crucial concept in more detail in the section 211 
entitled ‘Social Horizon’, as well as in the concluding paragraphs of this article.  212 
By far the most developed critical engagements with Solar have come from 213 
Greg Garrard. In a surprising turn, Garrard wrote what Johns-Putra and Trexler 214 
(2011, 192) described as ‘a playful engagement with the novel, analyzing it before it 215 
was published’. Using the development towards what he saw as ‘the notion of 216 
human nature’ across McEwan’s career to date, Garrard (2009, 696) claimed to be 217 
able to extrapolate how McEwan would engage with climate change in Solar. Such a 218 
move, suggested Garrard, might permit ‘a way around the formal obstacles to writing 219 
a novel about climate change’, which had, he said, been bound up in the opposing 220 
poles of ‘fatalism’ or ‘idealism’ (2009, 718). As fuel to this hypothesis, Garrard 221 
referred to statements made by McEwan himself, who, ahead of the novel’s 222 
publication, suggested that  223 
 224 
The thing that would have killed the book for me, I’m sure, is if I’d taken up 225 
any sort of moral position […] I needed a get-out clause. And the get-out 226 
clause is, this is an investigation of human nature, with some of the latitude 227 
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thrown in by comedy [...] I couldn't quite see how a novel would work without 228 
falling flat with moral intent (qtd. in (RealClimate and Network 2010)). 229 
 230 
Buoyed by these comments, Garrard goes on to suggest that Solar ‘may well 231 
provoke a fundamental shift in ecocritical assumptions […] to an anti-essentialist 232 
Darwinism’ (Garrard 2009, 718). Such a novel, Garrard dared to hope, would be 233 
capable of disabusing us of an essentialist ‘human nature’, one corroborated and 234 
consolidated over the long history of the European novel. McEwan’s treatment 235 
would, Garrard claimed, be able to deconstruct this position and offer up something 236 
commensurate with the global scale of the problem.  237 
In his following publications on Solar, however, Garrard has been unable to 238 
conceal his disappointment. Garrard’s main grievance, it seems, is with McEwan’s 239 
choice of form, which he sees as instrumental in limiting the potential of the novel to 240 
‘to give climate projections a moral salience they otherwise lack, and, by extension, 241 
encourage us to see carbon emissions as damnable rather than foolish’ (Garrard 242 
2013, 178). On the contrary, argues Garrard, Solar draws up  243 
 244 
a cruelly comic analogy between physical weight and carbon emissions that 245 
implies both obesity and global warming are failures of self-discipline – a 246 
convenient untruth that exonerates the fast food and fast fuel industries. [...] 247 
Yet the analogy of obesity to carbon emissions is inexact, and the 248 
representation of both forms of ‘excess’ as failures of individual resolve is 249 
deeply misleading. (Garrard 2013, 181–82)  250 
 251 
Garrard’s response is surprising, not only in terms of how he understands McEwan’s 252 
literary project, but also, I would argue, in terms of what Garrard envisages to be 253 
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literature’s general function vis-a-vis a problem like climate change. Firstly, as I will 254 
go on to argue, it is quite possible to use the presentation of Beard’s ‘immoral’ 255 
character to problematise ideas of an ‘essentialist’ human nature, consistent with the 256 
way Garrard had originally envisaged. In his 2009 article, for example, Garrard (718) 257 
claimed that ‘the work of fiction is to wonder at our human variety and commonality, 258 
it seems, not to seek to reform it’ (Garrard 2009, 718). Secondly, in his 2013 article 259 
Garrard reminds us that ‘Ecocriticism is not the literary critical department of the 260 
IPCC. [...] Climate has deep meanings in every culture that cannot simply be over-261 
ridden by a mass of climatological data’ (Garrard 2013, 186). Despite these 262 
comments, however, Garrard appears to want Solar to deliver solutions to climate 263 
change in a relatively straightforward manner. This is, as McEwan himself had 264 
suggested, not what Solar could possibly do (especially given its formal constraints), 265 
at least, not without ‘falling flat with moral intent’. Neither is it how we should view 266 
literature in this instance.  267 
What is offered below is a reading which acknowledges the surface level 268 
implications of Beard’s behaviour, but which goes beyond these in order to explore 269 
the ideological dynamics which structure them. In other words, despite Solar’s 270 
recapitulation of what Buell (1998, 663) calls ‘the traditional protocols of protagonist-271 
centred fiction’, we can still go ‘beyond’ Beard – that is, into what Jameson calls ‘the 272 
underside or […] the very political unconscious, of the text’. 273 
 274 
The Political Unconscious I: The Political Horizon 275 
 276 
In line with the three horizons envisaged by Jameson, my reading begins at the 277 
surface level. The first horizon, Jameson explains, reflects ‘the narrow sense of 278 
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punctual event and a chroniclelike sequence of happenings in time’ and ‘the 279 
passionate immediacy of struggles between historical individuals’ (Jameson 1989, 280 
75). This, according to Jameson is a reasonably straightforward process – the 281 
‘ordinary explication de texte’ – in which the text and its narrative are understood as 282 
‘a symbolic act, whereby real social contradictions, insurmountable in their own 283 
terms, find a purely formal resolution in the aesthetic realm’ (Jameson 1989, 79). 284 
Such a process, argues Jameson, is particularly important for grasping the way in 285 
which all cultural artefacts approach issues ‘insurmountable in their own terms’ and 286 
as ‘mythic resolutions of issues that they are unable to articulate conceptually’. 287 
(Jameson 1989, 79) Seen from this perspective, Solar is indeed preoccupied by the 288 
exploits of a deeply uncaring, selfish and troubled individual; against the backdrop of 289 
a global concern like climate change these characteristics are thrown into even 290 
sharper relief, and in ways which appear to fatally undercut any hope that such 291 
individuals might readily adopt more environmentally sound modes of thinking and 292 
acting. Indeed, climate change itself is often only a ‘background’ concern for Beard. 293 
Throughout the novel’s first section (entitled ‘2000’) – bar some minor incidental 294 
details (such as Beard’s appointment at the National Centre for Renewable Energy, 295 
and his dealings with Aldous) – we mostly bear witness to Beard’s fevered 296 
introspections. In one rare ‘worldly’ reflection Beard intimates that, for him, climate 297 
change 298 
 299 
was one in a list of issues, of looming sorrows, that comprised the background 300 
to the news, and he read about it, vaguely deplored it and expected 301 
governments to meet and take action. And of course he knew that a molecule 302 
of carbon dioxide absorbed energy in the infrared range, and that humankind 303 
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was putting these molecules into the atmosphere in significant quantities. But 304 
he himself had other things to think about. (15-16 [emphasis added]). 305 
 306 
If there is a chief reason for Beard’s indifference, then it is quite simply because ‘he 307 
himself had other things to think about’. Beard surveys the accumulating inventory of 308 
potential calamity without concern, from the coldly scientific perspective of the 309 
‘molecule of carbon dioxide’. There is no space in Beard’s appraisal for emotion or 310 
socialised sensibility to what climate change might mean to others. Up to a certain 311 
point, the justification given for Beard’s view is an otherwise healthy scepticism, 312 
calling out humankind’s myopia for believing itself to be ‘always living at the end of 313 
days, that one’s own demise was urgently bound up with the end of the world’ (16). 314 
But Beard’s apparent rationalism masks a stridently narrow individualism; the ‘other 315 
things to think about’ are no more profound than where the next shot of whisky, bout 316 
of intercourse, or deep-fried snack will come from. Beard is indeed, the paragon of 317 
the modern, liberal individual subject, a hard exterior concealing an interior in 318 
emotional chaos: ‘he was self-sufficient, self-absorbed, his mind a cluster of 319 
appetites and dreamy thoughts’ (169). Despite being self-consciously individualistic, 320 
Beard utterly fails to stay in control of himself, or, rather the competing versions of 321 
himself. In perhaps the best example of this (indeed, in a moment which, for Garrard, 322 
undoes the whole novel), awaking after a heavy night’s drinking, Beard, ‘began to 323 
form the familiar resolution, then dismissed it, for he knew he was no match for that 324 
late-morning version of himself, for example, en route from Berlin, reclining in the 325 
sunlit cabin, a gin and tonic to hand’ (184). Beard is not simply a victim of his own 326 
appetites, but rather a schizoid composite of rational calculation and powerful 327 
libidinousness; Beard’s inner life becomes vicissitudinous in the extreme, vacillating 328 




Where Beard is single minded is in the pursuit of profit. His so called ‘mission’ to get 331 
the solar panel project off the ground, for example, turns out to be little more than a 332 
thinly-veiled money-making scheme. Beard addresses investors on the subject of 333 
climate change for an ‘unnaturally inflated fee’ but also because if, as a result, he 334 
manages to sell one or two panels ‘even by the smallest of fractions, his own 335 
company must benefit’ (112). So much is Beard’s pursuit of profit a blind compulsion, 336 
in fact, that when he encounters difficulties and attempts to play the victim, we can 337 
only wonder at his audacity: 338 
 339 
He did not deserve these distractions. They were encircling him, women, an 340 
Albuquerque lawyer, a north-London criminal, the unquiet cells of his own 341 
body, in a conspiracy to prevent him making his gift to the world. None of this 342 
was his fault. People had said of him that he was brilliant, and that was right, 343 
he was a brilliant man trying to do good. Self-pity steadied him a little (236-7). 344 
 345 
Through moments such as these, we get an impression of the extent of Beard’s self-346 
delusion. Indeed, the sheer repressive effort manifests in more than merely 347 
psychological ways. As with Beard’s psychological, relationship and financial 348 
problems, his bodily ailments are listed for us in gratuitous and morbid detail: 349 
 350 
Pathogens swam in hordes across the moat of his defences, they swarmed 351 
over the castle walls armed with cold sores, mouth ulcers, fatigue, joint pain, 352 
watery bowels, nose acne, blepharitis – a new one this, a disfiguring 353 
inflammation of the eyelids that erupted into white-peaked Mount Fuji styes 354 
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that pressured his eyeballs, blurring his vision. Insomnia and monomania also 355 
distorted his view (22). 356 
 357 
While important for the development of Beard’s character, we must not forget, as 358 
Jameson suggests, that such details are ‘symbolic’, a means by which ‘real social 359 
contradictions, insurmountable in their own terms, find a purely formal resolution in 360 
the aesthetic realm’ (Jameson 1989, 79). In the words of Hans-Georg Gadamer 361 
(2004, 304), Jameson’s theoretical precursor for the concept of ‘horizons’, ‘[to] 362 
acquire a horizon means that one learns to look beyond what is close at hand – not 363 
in order to look away from it but to see it better, within a larger whole and in truer 364 
proportion’. In Jameson’s second ‘horizon’, then, we apprehend this ‘larger whole’ by 365 
viewing Solar as one utterance within ‘the essentially antagonistic collective 366 
discourses of social classes’. Solar’s social relations are at root antagonistic; that is, 367 
as Jameson understands it, ‘two opposing discourses [fighting] it out within the 368 
general unity of a shared code’ (Jameson 1989, 84). Seen from this perspective, 369 
Beard’s actions can be seen beyond the ‘chronicle-like’ drama of the text, as 370 
utterances which take part in (and influence) larger process; namely, patterns of 371 
social relations. 372 
 373 
 374 
The Political Unconscious II: The Social Horizon 375 
 376 
At the level of social relations, one must concede that Solar is clearly 377 
conducive to a number of allegorical readings. As Zemanek (2012, 56) suggests, 378 
Beard’s story ‘in its entirety constitute[s] an allegory’ of climate change; however, 379 
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within this horizon should also be included the broader discursive tensions and 380 
antagonisms relating to class or other forms of social inequality. Solar is brimming 381 
with details like this – of Beard’s class hypocrisy, his sexism, and consumerist 382 
apathy. These types of problematic relations are indeed what most readers of Solar 383 
(including Garrard) have focussed on, and there is a lot of mileage in them. 384 
Conversely, what I argue here is that, while allegory is useful for identifying certain 385 
social tensions and contradictions reflected by the novel, it should not be where we 386 
end our analysis. Indeed, not only does Solar’s allegory ultimately collapse under its 387 
own telegraphed absurdity, but using Jameson’s horizons, it is possible to look 388 
beyond this collapse to another horizon, that of the text’s historical production.  389 
This is perhaps the most contentious move in the procedure I outline here, for 390 
it involves first demonstrating how Solar works as an allegory of antagonistic 391 
discourses before moving on to demonstrate the significance of its allegory’s fatal 392 
limitations. It is compelling, for instance, to note the structural similarities between 393 
Beard’s positionality as a privileged white man and mainstream collective inaction on 394 
climate change. Indeed, consistent with allegory, this appears to iterate into the 395 
smallest details of the events described. Consider, for example, the breakdown of 396 
Beard’s fifth marriage, which might be read as an exercise in how not to act during a 397 
crisis. When Beard discovers a note from his wife informing him with cruel honesty 398 
that she is ‘staying over’ at her lover’s house that night, Beard entertains going 399 
‘round to the mock-Tudor ex-council semi [...] to mash the man’s brains with his own 400 
monkey wrench’ (5). Those acquainted with environmentalist literature might be 401 
reminded here of Edward Abbey’s full-blooded depiction of environmental activism, 402 
The Monkey Wrench Gang (1975), but, if so, that is as far as the comparison goes. 403 
As we have already heard, Beard’s impulse to act is only momentary; instead, he 404 
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simply ‘watched television for five hours’ (5), trying, and failing, to distract himself 405 
with alcohol.  406 
When Beard does act, he often does so in an extremely childish way. In a 407 
particularly farcical display, Beard pretends to have an extra-marital lover of his own, 408 
creating sounds designed to convince his estranged wife that there is someone in his 409 
room with him, using the TV to approximate voices, laughing periodically to non-410 
existent jokes and even using his hands to simulate the sound of two sets of feet on 411 
the stairs. ‘This was the kind of logical plan’, we are told ‘only a madman might 412 
embrace’ (10). When Beard sees a bruise on Patrice’s face he again contemplates 413 
action, ‘lingering on the detail of his right fist bursting through the cartilage of Tarpin’s 414 
nose’. The idea does not, however, develop beyond the realm of fantasy, as ‘with 415 
minor revisions, he reconsidered the scene through closed eyes, and did not stir until 416 
the following morning’ (14). Episodes like this neatly lampoon the worst kind of 417 
behaviours associated with climate change, from straightforward inaction, fantasy, 418 
self-deprecation, to (in the case of Beard’s fictitious lover) ‘politics as simulation’, 419 
analogues of which have come to prominence within analyses of climate change 420 
policy (Clark 2010, 141). Given the context of the novel (i.e. climate change), even 421 
episodes as apparently trivial as this can easily be recast in light of patterns of social 422 
relations. 423 
These episodes also set us up for the rest of the novel within which we 424 
encounter numerous other domestic and personal foibles which become difficult to 425 
dissociate from the broader topic of the social relations which lie behind action and 426 
discourse on climate change. For example, Beard’s uneven slovenliness (despite 427 
having an obscenely untidy flat, he is ‘clean about his person, vain about his clothes’ 428 
(163)); his avoidance of his own accumulating bodily disorders, despite 429 
overwhelming evidence; his imperviousness in the face of huge changes in his life, 430 
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like the birth of his daughter; and his vast appetite for food and alcohol, while in full 431 
awareness of its detrimental effect on his physical and emotional wellbeing. The 432 
resemblance of Beard’s personal foibles to the problems of climate change is more 433 
than merely schematic, there are also linguistic resonances. As if in some kind of 434 
pathetic fallacy, the ‘sickness’ of the planet begins to manifest in spectacular 435 
sympathy on Beards body. This phenomenon is best demonstrated in a passage 436 
already quoted, which takes on new significance when considered in the wider 437 
environmental and social context. Beard lists his ailments, including a condition 438 
called ‘blepharitis’, which, as we have already heard, ‘erupted into white-peaked 439 
Mount Fuji styes’ (22). Similarly, just before Beard gives his speech to investors he 440 
undergoes an untimely bout of food poisoning, during which 441 
 442 
he felt an oily nausea at something monstrous and rotten from the sea, 443 
stranded on the tidal mud flats of a stagnant estuary, decaying gaseously in 444 
his gut and welling up, contaminating his breath, his words and, suddenly, his 445 
thoughts. 446 
“The planet,” he said, surprising himself, “is sick.” (148) 447 
 448 
The echo of environmental despoilment in both these examples is striking, bringing a 449 
bodily-scale to a global phenomenon. Similarly, Beard’s neglected flat, which he 450 
imagines as ‘a parallel civilisation, invisible and mute, successful living entities […] 451 
would have long settled to their specialised feasts, and when the fuel ran out, they 452 
would dry to a smear of charcoal dust’ (110). The descriptions of climate change and 453 
personal foibles become intricately and ineluctably intertwined, often sitting side-by-454 
side in mutual reinforcement. Indications appear, in fact, that Beard himself has 455 
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begun to notice these resonances: ‘“Don’t be a denier”, Doctor Parks had said, 456 
appearing to refer back to their climate-change chats’ (238).  457 
As Zemanek has noted, the allegories stack up to such an extent as to create 458 
a ‘hall of mirrors’ effect (2012, 56). This happens so much, in fact, that we begin to 459 
understand climate change through Beard’s ailments, foibles, and failed diets, rather 460 
than the other way around. At one point Beard describes a carbon trading scheme 461 
that might permit a ‘coal-burning company’ to ‘rightfully claim that its operations were 462 
carbon neutral’ (187). While this could easily be seen as little more than a clever 463 
inversion calculated to entertain, it is, I argue, of crucial significance for any attempt 464 
to move beyond the surface level of the text, to the social, and later historical 465 
horizons. Whereas we might begin reading Solar unable to avoid reading Beard’s 466 
personal life in light of the politics of climate change, the situation has now reversed. 467 
It is now carbon trading that we understand in terms of self-delusion, as an imprint of 468 
our essential ‘human frailty’. What are we to make of this allegorical ‘hall of mirrors’ 469 
vis-à-vis a reading of Solar’s environmental politics? Are we, as Garrard argues, to 470 
take it as an ‘essentialist’ (and defeatist) statement about human incapacity? The 471 
proposition, I argue, is absurd, and neatly demonstrates the logical breakdown of the 472 
allegorical connection between personal responsibility and global climate change. 473 
Indeed, that we should read personal actions in terms of climate change is one thing, 474 
that we should do the opposite is quite another, like trying to understand a ‘crime’ 475 
without considering social and historical context. What such readings reveal is not 476 
the de facto stability of such allegorical readings, but their patent instability, their 477 
absurd inversion of cause and effect. To take them at face value would be to ascent 478 
to the view that individuals create structures, rather than the other way around. Far 479 
from being a natural or ‘essential’ liberal individual, Beard appears more and more 480 
as a paper-thin construct. If we have in view social relations rather than the isolated 481 
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individual, then the absurd idea that climate change is somehow a function of our 482 
‘nature’ begins to collapse.  483 
While Jameson’s theory offers a framework supple enough to elucidate the 484 
forbidding complexity of world-historical processes, this does not negate McEwan’s 485 
own skilled handling of his material. Indeed, his ironic deployment of allegory 486 
provides useful – and more to the point enjoyable – cues to the deeper, structural 487 
processes which Jameson attempts to synthesise. Note, for example, the hints of 488 
chivalric language in some of the quotes already described – the pathogens which 489 
swarm ‘in hordes across the moat of his defences […] over the castle walls armed 490 
with cold sores’, or Beard’s own farcical attempts to assail Turpin’s ‘mock-Tudor ex-491 
council semi’, bringing to mind a time-travelling Don Quixote stumbling his way 492 
through modern day residential landscapes.  493 
These ironic resonances of one of allegory’s archetypal features – the 494 
proverbial ‘knight in shining armour’ – aren’t simply there for ornamentation, but 495 
signpost a gentle mocking of the genre, and McEwan’s intent to go beyond the fatal 496 
limitations of seeing allegory, as C.S. Lewis (qtd. Owens 2008, xxii) describes it, ‘as 497 
a cryptogram, existing only to be decoded’. Instead, as Lewis continues, we should 498 
see it as a way of ‘moving always into the book, not out of it’. As Jameson’s theory 499 
suggests, our readings should not resolve themselves at the social horizon (though 500 
this is exactly where many critics of the novel have ended their analysis). Instead, as 501 
with climate change, the compulsion to see Beard’s character as the cause rather 502 
than the symptom of a systemic flaw can only be surmounted by pushing the 503 
analysis to a wider ‘horizon’. Such an idea demands an analysis at the level of what 504 
Jameson calls the ‘mode of production’, which here I take to mean the current set of 505 
social and economic arrangements understood as the culmination of a vast historical 506 
process. Seen from this perspective – as I will go on to argue below – Beard is no 507 
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longer irredeemably entangled in antagonistic social relations, but, instead, can be 508 
seen as part of a dialectical structure, one which moves precisely because of its 509 
contradictions. 510 
 511 
The Political Unconscious III: The Historical Horizon 512 
 513 
By moving out into the third horizon, the idea is to consider texts in ‘the ultimate 514 
horizon of human history as a whole’ as ‘the symbolic messages transmitted to us by 515 
the coexistence of various sign systems which are themselves traces or anticipations 516 
of modes of production’ (Jameson 1989, 76). In the context of Solar, this refers to the 517 
contemporary setting of the novel in both its discursive and material forms, but seen 518 
as the ‘end product’ of a totalising historical process. It is by making this move that 519 
‘essentialist’ (and politically defeatist) textual features can be deconstructed most 520 
effectively.  521 
By positioning Beard in the ‘untranscendable horizon’ of history, rather than as 522 
a representative of an immovable and ‘essentialised human nature’, one is first able 523 
to grasp his role within a historical contestation at the level of a contingent and 524 
mutable ideology. In short, Beard’s antagonism is changeable, his position not one of 525 
ahistorical ‘essence’ but of the adversarial (and highly unstable) forces of the 526 
‘dominant’ and ‘emergent’ (to borrow Raymond Williams’ (2009, 121–27) famous 527 
terminology). Using this figure, Beard’s position may well appear ‘dominant’ now, but 528 
could easily become displaced by ‘emergent’ forces stemming from uniquely 529 
contemporary circumstances, rendering his position ‘residual’ or irrelevant. Solar’s 530 
‘utopian impulse’, if one can call it this, is buried beneath the (admittedly distracting) 531 
surface of Beard’s moral turpitude. By looking beyond this façade, however, one not 532 
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only sees more clearly the mobilisation of ‘emergent’ forms (i.e. those forming in 533 
response to a world in the midst of environmental catastrophe), but also the 534 
usefulness of the political unconscious: they are – appropriately for emergent forms 535 
– at the periphery or ‘underside’ of the novel’s plot; Beard’s own ‘dominant’ position 536 
manifests with increasing incoherence, attested by his comic foibles and desperate 537 
incoherence. 538 
Beard’s dominance is signalled via a cluster of features befitting his identity 539 
position (i.e. white, straight, male), his economic class (i.e. upper-middle, Oxford 540 
educated, affluent), but, most importantly of all, in the novel’s very structure; that is, 541 
via the ‘the traditional protocols of protagonist-centred fiction’. Each simultaneously 542 
confirms Beard’s ‘dominant’ position, though arguably, too, the inevitability of his 543 
demise. He is, as we have seen, utterly atomised: ‘self-sufficient, self-absorbed, his 544 
mind a cluster of appetites and dreamy thoughts’, but in such a way which leaves 545 
him stranded emotionally and politically, for ‘like many clever men who prize 546 
objectivity, he was a solipsist at heart, and in his heart was a nugget of ice’ (169). 547 
Beard is irredeemable, as a ‘childless man at a certain age at the end of his fifth 548 
marriage could afford a touch of nihilism’ (75), and yet he is simultaneously able to 549 
acknowledge that any solution to climate change requires us to step beyond the 550 
individualism he embodies: during his speech to investors, he remarks ‘Virtue is too 551 
passive, too narrow. Virtue can motivate individuals, but for groups, societies, a 552 
whole civilisation, it’s a weak force’ (149).  553 
The speech is perhaps the best example in the book of Beard’s desperate 554 
incoherence, dressed up in the clothes of sense. Interestingly, in his review of the 555 
novel, climate scientist, Stefan Rahmstorf, even went as far as to call it a ‘riveting 556 
speech’, one that he would be ‘tempted to steal and use verbatim myself at some 557 
occasion’ (RealClimate and Network 2010). As we have already seen, Beard is on 558 
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the verge of bodily and mental breakdown throughout the speech; his value system, 559 
too, is equally on the verge of collapse. Though Beard points to the obvious need to 560 
move away from individual thinking, recommending what he calls ‘the pleasures of 561 
ingenuity and co-operation’ (149), he concludes ‘that in a grave situation, a crisis, we 562 
understand, sometimes too late, that it is not in other people, or in the system, or in 563 
the nature of things that the problem lies, but in ourselves, our own follies and 564 
unexamined assumptions’ (155). As we discover, the remarks are not part of a 565 
coherent world-view but merely the first thing that came into his head to say as ‘he 566 
hurried towards his conclusion’: ‘Were his points somewhat forced, or had he 567 
stumbled upon two important truths? No time to consider’ (155).  568 
As well as providing an entertaining farce, Beard’s incoherence is contingent 569 
on the contradictory objectives which have been set for him in the speech; that is, to 570 
find a way for a dominant economic and political class to both participate in the 571 
revolutionary overturning of their mode of production while miraculously retaining a 572 
grip on power. Beard’s aim, in other words, appears to be to encourage the 573 
progenitors of inequality and industrial-scale environmental ruin to be both ‘part of 574 
the process’ and ‘make very large sums of money, staggering sums’ by precipitating 575 
‘another industrial revolution’ (148). Indeed, the reference to ‘another industrial 576 
revolution’ is where Beard’s proposal is most nakedly contradictory, citing as it does 577 
a period in history during which the current dominance of the capitalist classes was 578 
secured, and the environmentally destructive project of industrialisation set in 579 
motion. Beard’s role is to dress up the reproduction of power in the rhetoric of 580 
revolution; it is this fatal contradiction which Beard’s character comes to embody. 581 
Many commentators have come to identify climate change as symptomatic of 582 
the limitations of the current mode of production. This is no less true in Solar, where, 583 
in Beard’s words, climate change involves the search for a ‘new energy source for 584 
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the whole of civilisation’ (34). Yet Beard’s attempts to cash in on solar energy are 585 
indicative of the contradictions at the heart of his attempt as a ‘dominant’ to retain 586 
power in the transition to a new mode of production, without considerations of the 587 
new political forms (including ideas of collective responsibility) which must 588 
accompany this. When Beard encounters difficulties in realising his plan, he (of 589 
course) overlooks these contradictions. Instead he imagines a ‘conspiracy’ (236), or 590 
and blames the ‘sclerotic’ markets (205) for impeding his attempts to give ‘his gift to 591 
the world’ (236). By now it is obvious that Beard’s difficulties can be traced to his 592 
failure to identify a politically appropriate strategy for rolling out a solar energy 593 
project.  594 
In renewable energy discourses, solar energy has enjoyed a number of 595 
positive associations, promising not only a clean energy source, but also an 596 
opportunity to decentralise control of energy generation to the advantage of local 597 
communities (Kunze and Becker 2015). Though there are certainly those who 598 
contest the logistics of this (e.g. MacKay 2010), solar power’s symbolic status as an 599 
‘energy commons’ remains formidable, as demonstrated by cultural and political 600 
phenomena like ‘solarpunk’ (Hamilton 2017) and the still sizeable number solar 601 
cooperatives in operation today (Heras-Saizarbitoria et al. 2018). As such, Beard’s 602 
attempt to patent solar energy must be seen as a jarring attempt to enclose an 603 
emblematic energy commons within a regime of industrial-scale capital 604 
accumulation. Moreover, Beard’s plan is incoherent within both dominant and 605 
emergent-collective economic paradigms. Again, the problem is best captured in 606 
Beard’s own words. During a speech to mark the unveiling of the project, Beard – 607 
with galling false modesty – claims that ‘I can claim nothing for myself. I stood, like 608 
Newton, on the shoulders of giants’ (249), even going on to add that he ‘borrowed 609 
slavishly from nature [...] by imitating photosynthesis’ (249-50). Beard thus describes 610 
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the project not only as a historical ‘inevitability’, but in terms of a common heritage, 611 
promising ‘we will have clean energy, endlessly self-renewing, and we can begin to 612 
draw back from the brink of disastrous, self-destructive global warming’ (250).  613 
However, Beard’s claims here prove to be the exact opposite of how the solar 614 
project is actually rolled out. Beard has not only stolen the idea from Aldous, but is 615 
desperately trying to ensure no one but him benefits financially from it – ‘his thoughts 616 
turned obsessively, uselessly around the project. He held seventeen patents in the 617 
panels’ (230). Neither is Beard motivated by a desire to save the planet. In order to 618 
generate the kind of financial (and political) buy-in necessary to kick-start his 619 
business – which Beard alone hopes to profit from using his patents – the planet 620 
must first reach near oblivion. When Beard’s associate begins to doubt the viability of 621 
the scheme due to reports that ‘the scientists have gotten it wrong’ about climate 622 
change (215), Beard gleefully reassures him that ‘The UN estimates that already a 623 
third of a million people a year are dying from climate change. [...] It’s a catastrophe. 624 
Relax!’ (217). 625 
Far from being an indication of some universal truth about ‘human nature’, 626 
Beard’s character flaws show ‘dominant’ modes of thought and production to be both 627 
constructed and redundant – especially in the ideological context of liberal 628 
individualism. Beard, we are told, ‘does not believe in inner change only slow inner 629 
and outer decay’ (66). The unravelling of Beard’s personal life – concretised in his 630 
turbulent love affairs, aggrieved family, the wrongly imprisoned Tarpin, and unpaid 631 
debts – invites us to see the anachronism of the way he thinks, embodying a 632 
dangerously outdated mode of production in personal foibles. This reading is in stark 633 
contrast to, for example, Garrard’s concerns over the ‘the representation of both 634 
forms of “excess” as failures of individual resolve’ (Garrard 2013, 182).  635 
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But if Beard is the embodiment of a mode of production on the verge of 636 
collapse, where are the viable alternatives, or, as Jameson would put it, the 637 
‘anticipations of modes of production’? For an answer, we must return to the political 638 
unconscious: alternatives to Beard’s doomed thinking occur in the background to 639 
Beard’s emblematically ‘dominant’ modes of thought and action. Nonetheless, the 640 
peripheral alternatives represent the hope – the ‘utopian impulse’ – within the 641 
‘emergent’ forces of anticipated modes of production. These concern behaviours 642 
conspicuous at odds with ones we associate with Beard, such as emotional 643 
sensitivity, openness, honesty, collective ownership, loyalty, forgiveness, and 644 
generosity. The literary corollary then to a contestation of an ideology of 645 
‘responsibilitization’ comes through a deconstruction of the idea that the central 646 
protagonist is the key site of change. We must ‘look beyond’ Beard, as Gadamer 647 
would put it, to change happening at the periphery, in the text’s emergent and 648 
collective forms. 649 
 Perhaps the most straightforward example is Beard’s daughter, Catriona. She 650 
is described as having an extreme degree of ‘emotional delicacy’, even, we are told, 651 
to the point of ‘experienc[ing] another mind as a tangible force field, whose waves 652 
were overwhelming, like Atlantic breakers’ (220). Alongside Beard’s own emotional 653 
deficiency, Catriona’s experience offers a telling counterpoint. Similarly, Beard’s 654 
lover, Melissa, whose love and commitment to him he understands as ‘a flaw in her 655 
character’, the product of a ‘delusion’ (159). Beard, by contrast, was ‘pleased that he 656 
himself had never fallen properly in love’ (257). 657 
Beard does not always fail to recognise ‘emergent’ behaviours when he sees 658 
them, though is condemned only to glimpse them momentarily, or uselessly after the 659 
fact. In perhaps the book’s most famous passage Beard becomes what McEwan 660 
calls an ‘unwitting thief’ (157). The episode concerns Beard’s silent confrontation with 661 
27 
 
a man on the train who he assumes is eating his packet of crisps. Readers are led to 662 
believe that indeed the man sitting across from Beard is openly stealing his food, 663 
only to discover later that they indeed belonged to the other man. After discovering 664 
his error Beard 665 
 666 
stood so completely revealed to himself, a naked fool, that he felt purified and 667 
redeemed, like a penitent, like an elated medieval flagellant with a newly 668 
flayed back. That poor fellow whose food and drink you devoured, who offered 669 
you his last morsels, fetched down your luggage, was a friend to man. No, no, 670 
that was not for now, the agony of retrospection must be postponed (127). 671 
 672 
Beard grasps very well the other man’s vast tolerance and magnanimity – in 673 
stark contrast to his own brutish and petty behaviour. Yet in the same moment he 674 
‘postpones’ any serious self-analysis. 675 
Lastly, and most importantly, Tom Aldous – the man whose accidental death 676 
Beard frames Tarpin for, and from whom he ultimately steals the designs for the 677 
revolutionary solar panels. Aldous’ character is a representative of a contrasting faith 678 
in the possibility of a collective responsibility. Aldous’ sense of collectivity is so 679 
automatic, in fact, that he is quite prepared to bring Beard in on the solar energy 680 
project, simply as a means to ‘“do what’s right by the planet”’ (34). Aldous’ idealism, 681 
however, easily becomes the target of Beard’s world-weary cynicism: 682 
 683 
Aldous had a mind that was designed, through the medium of a Norfolk 684 
accent, to offer tireless advice, make recommendations, urge changes, or 685 
express enthusiasm for some journey or holiday or book or vitamin, which 686 




Beard detests the man from the outset, and while his character assassination of 689 
Aldous is entertainingly executed, as the novel develops it is Aldous who is 690 
vindicated. His designs turn out to be inspired, his invention potentially world-691 
changing; it is only in Beard’s selfish hands that it all falls apart. Indeed, without 692 
Aldous (who otherwise demonstrated the intention to direct the project towards 693 
democratic ownership) the solar project collapses under the weight of its own 694 
economic and philosophical contradictions. Interestingly, the novel’s conclusion 695 
brings an (admittedly ambiguous hint) that the project will be brought under some 696 
form of collective control. With Aldous dead and his work now owned by the 697 
government, Beard is sued by those ‘“keen to see the Centre own the patents and 698 
show the taxpayer a decent return”’ (272). This ending is by no means an idyllic 699 
resolution; however, it is certainly more promising than Beard’s vision of private 700 
capitalisation. Either way, Beard’s main role as protagonist is instrumental in 701 
revealing the ‘emergent’ dynamic of a collectivist and sustainable solution to power 702 
generation and distribution. What’s more, Beard’s individualism casts those around 703 
him in a more noticeably collective form. Aldous himself is anonymous to Beard, at 704 
least until he catches him sleeping with his wife(!). Up to that point Aldous belonged 705 
to a group which Beard, ‘could not, or chose not to, tell [...] apart […] Far better to 706 
treat them all the same, somewhat distantly, or as if they were one person’ (20). 707 
Though the passage arrives to us initially as part of Beard’s comedic disdain, 708 
it is essential in highlighting the ideological antagonism between an ‘emergent’ 709 
collective will and the individualistic drive which structures a capitalist mode of 710 
production. If Aldous (one of Solar’s understated, ‘emergent’ collective heroes) had 711 
occupied a more central role, the novel would not only have ‘fallen flat with moral 712 
intent’, as McEwan feared, but also reproduced the same problematic one-713 
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dimensional focus I have been trying to argue against in this article. With Beard’s 714 
ideological antagonists at the periphery, this sort of impasse is circumvented, 715 
allowing those around him to take on the form of structural, cultural rhythms of the 716 
‘multitude’. Beard, again, is deeply and comically mistaken when he muses, ‘If he 717 
was sometimes greedy, selfish, calculating, mendacious, when to be otherwise 718 
would embarrass him, then so was everyone else’ (170). It is Beard, in fact, who is 719 
the odd one out, who is struggling to hold on to a world which around him, is moving 720 




What then does this say about the ‘new forms of responsibility’ I mentioned at the 725 
start of this article? One thing to acknowledge (or admit?) is that neither Solar nor 726 
this paper can yield uncomplicated blueprints to, in Adorno’s words, a fully realised 727 
‘emancipated society’ – these remain, in Jameson’s words, mere ‘anticipations’. 728 
This, I hope, will not be seen as a cop-out, but as a fair reflection of the extensive 729 
and corrosive effects of a narrow individualism, writ large both on the novel itself, its 730 
reception, and contemporary climate change discourse more broadly.1 The 731 
                                                          
1  Solar’s interrogation of allegory reflects a widespread and extremely dysfunctional discourse 
around climate change and responsibility. For instance, a number of books have merged in recent 
years which, while providing otherwise interesting insights into the dynamics of climate change, seem 
to revel in the contradiction between climate change and who we are (i.e. our ‘nature’) (e.g. Stoknes 
2015; Beattie 2010; Norgaard 2011), and in a way which seems to consolidate these tendencies 
rather than free us from them. The subtitle alone to George Marshall’s (2014) Don’t Even Think About 
It – ‘Why our brains are wired to ignore climate change’, for example, gives a powerful indication of 
what it thinks about the human capacity to change and find new forms of responsibility.  
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boogieman of the liberal individualism still looms large in modern political thought; 732 
the centrality of Beard’s character registers this, but he also embodies the urgency 733 
with which we must deconstruct and move beyond such thinking. In light of this, I 734 
move now to draw out the advantages of approaching the novel in the way I 735 
propose, and some of the broader implications of doing so.  736 
I begin by returning to the subject of the novel’s form. Clearly a central 737 
stumbling block in the interpretation of the novel is its generic baggage of ‘allegory’. 738 
That critics have focused on allegory is understandable: Solar, as I argued in ‘section 739 
II’, lends itself very easily to allegorical readings. The problem, however, is how 740 
critics have allowed this to limit how they have approached both the novel itself, and 741 
allegory in general. As Rosemund Tuve (qtd. Greenfield 1998, 168) suggests, 742 
‘allegory is a method of reading by which we are made to think about things we 743 
already know’; as such, it is a way of opening up interpretation rather than, as 744 
already suggested, a ‘cryptogram’ with only one way of being ‘decoded’. Without this 745 
understanding, allegory can easily become a ‘hall of mirrors’ in which readers can be 746 
trapped, looking for a type of meaning which literary texts routinely confound. As 747 
Maureen Quilligan (1992, 227) puts it, ‘If the reader begins with a presumptuous 748 
sense that he already knows how to interpret, the narrative will first teach him that he 749 
does not’.  750 
In keeping with an idea of allegory as a way to open up interpretation, Solar’s 751 
engagement with allegory is demonstrably playful, ironic even – as Trexler (2015) 752 
suggests ‘Solar interrogates allegory’ [my emphasis], rather than using it to make 753 
simple points. These battles have been fought before. Consider, for example, 754 
comments made by J.M. Coetzee that ‘there is a game going on between the covers 755 
of the book, but it is not always the game you think it is’ (Coetzee 1988, 3–4). On the 756 




one hand, Coetzee’s provocation here was aimed at what he saw as a reductive 757 
literary politics: to a greater extent than McEwan, perhaps, Coetzee was reacting to 758 
calls for him to create straightforwardly ‘committed’ literature, a stance which he 759 
routinely resisted through his playful engagements with allegory. On the other, this 760 
statement too was about remaining humble as to the possibility of the literary text 761 
having a life of its own. McEwan seems to have constructed Solar in a similar way; 762 
like Coetzee, Solar sets up a simple game in the foreground, only to fatally 763 
problematize its simple presuppositions later on: i.e. that we have an essential 764 
‘human nature’; that something as complex as climate change can be exhaustively 765 
captured in allegory; that Beard is somehow ‘all of us’ when he is clearly a construct 766 
of his environment, his class, of McEwan himself. Beard can no more demonstrate 767 
the limits of humankind than Stalinism demonstrated the impossibility of collective 768 
politics.  769 
 The final thing to say about allegory, then, is that to move beyond it is not 770 
easy; its analogies have a serious gravitational pull, combined with a simplicity that 771 
simultaneously makes them very easy to dismiss. Indeed, Solar (or any other novel) 772 
couldn’t possibly unravel the Gordian knot of climate change, single-handedly. And 773 
this is where Jameson’s ‘political unconscious’ comes to the fore. Using Jameson’s 774 
three horizons, it is possible to approach the literary space in a way which can help 775 
us to focus on other things, to move from the superficies of the text to its 776 
‘unconscious’. What I have offered above is a reading which begins by 777 
acknowledging the importance of a text’s individual and social horizons, but which 778 
attempts to go beyond them in order to explore the ideological dynamics which 779 
structure both the novel and its social context. This is not to dismiss the first two 780 
horizons; indeed, cold and detached ‘objective’ analyses (such as those associated 781 
with historical materialism) are as much limited as those that focus on the individual 782 
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(which can easily be drawn into the disorienting vortex of human emotion) – 783 
certainly, we need all three to complete the picture of Jameson’s (1989, 95) 784 
‘crisscrossed and intersected’ web of ‘social reality’. 785 
Though patently difficult, this is precisely the kind of process to which we must 786 
all – in cultural contexts or otherwise – be sensitive. Environmental discourse must 787 
be examined in similar ways for signs of our world being apprehended, not via its full 788 
causal complexity (as climate change deserves to be understood) but as a flat, 789 
reified whole. In Jameson’s (1989, 11) own words, the realisation of this challenge – 790 
as has been made clear by the devastating impact of climate change on our thinking 791 
and (in)action – ‘lie[s] beyond the boundaries of our own world’. Indeed, as Jameson 792 
(1989, 11) admits, if one looks to the political unconscious for ready-made ‘forms of 793 
collective thinking and collective culture […] the reader will there find an empty chair 794 
reserved for some as yet unrealized, collective, and decentred cultural production of 795 
the future, beyond realism and modernism alike’ [my emphasis].  796 
As much as this caveat highlights the importance of contemporary cultural 797 
production in connecting us to the anticipations of future forms of social organisation, 798 
Jameson is careful also to acknowledge that this is an as yet unrealised process. 799 
This process – collective, for sure, but also off the page – will certainly not be 800 
enacted by the ‘Beards’ of this world, but by those able to read beyond his failings, to 801 
devise and develop models of collective action which for now can only be glimpsed 802 
at the margins of our societies, in our collective unconscious. These will only emerge 803 
through a long and difficult process of experimentation and courageous action. 804 
 805 
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